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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
MIGUEL ANGEL FLORES, : Case No. 970215-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AND DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ARSON. 
Despite the troublesome degree of inconsistency within the 
accomplice testimony that serves as the sole basis for the 
aggravated arson conviction of Flores, the State maintains that the 
evidence is "more than sufficient to support" the jury's verdict. 
State's Brief ("S.B.") at 17. The State argues that the accomplice 
testimonies of Wanda Fox ("Fox"), Melissa Chacon ("Chacon"), David 
Samora ("Samora"), and Gustave Dutson ("Dutson") "collectively and 
consistently [established] defendant's knowing and intentional 
involvement in the [aggravated arson]."1 S.B. 20. The State also 
relies upon the accounts of the accomplices to demonstrate that the 
elements of aggravated robbery have been satisfied. Id. at 20-21. 
The State glosses over two fundamental problems which render 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995) provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of 
fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a 
participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
the evidence insufficient: (1) The prosecution gained the 
accomplices' statements in exchange for grants of immunity and/or 
beneficial plea bargains, except for Fox, who was not charged at 
all despite her admitted involvement in the conspiracy to bomb the 
house.2 R. 131 [144,155,158,199] , 132 [247] ; see also Appellant's 
Brief ("A.B.") at 17-21; (2) The testimonies of the accomplices are 
not so consistent or conclusive that the jury's verdict was 
justified in this case. A.B. 21-25; see also State v. Quada, 918 
P.2d 883, 887, cert, denied 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996) ("evidence is 
insufficient where, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, [it] xis sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted'") (quotation omitted). 
The State initially takes issue with the cases relied on by 
Flores, particularly United States v. Yoakam, 116 F.3d 1346, 1349-
50 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Earl, 27 F.3d 423, 425-26 
(9th Cir. 1994); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 194-98 (Utah 1987); 
2
 The State asserts that Flores incorrectly intimated in 
his opening brief that Fox received some sort of leniency in 
exchange for her testimony. See S.B. 27. However, Flores does 
not make such a representation and, in fact, acknowledges that 
Fox was not even charged in the incident and did not receive 
leniency in exchange for her testimony. See A.B. 18. Hence, the 
State's characterization of Flores' brief is incorrect. 
The State makes several more allegations that Flores 
misrepresents or improperly draws from the record. See S.B. 29-
30, 31 n.10, 32. Flores does not misrepresent the record, 
however. Rather, Flores, like the State, accurately cites to the 
record and draws legitimate inferences therefrom in order to 
present his argument to this Court. The State's accusation, 
therefore, is unfounded. 
2 
and State v. Pratt, 475 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Utah 1970). See S.B. 22-
28; see A.B. 15-17. The State urges that the "facts of this case 
do not exhibit inconsistencies remotely akin to those of Walker, 
Pratt, Earl, and Yoakam. " S.B. 24. The State does not explain how 
these cases are distinguishable. 
The evidentiary concerns in the aforementioned cases 
resonate here, however. Specifically, the inconsistencies in the 
accomplice testimony are similar to those of the uncorroborated 
informant testimony in Earl which rendered the evidence in that 
case too "insubstantial" to support the verdict for possession. 
See Earl, 27 F.3d at 425. For example, the Earl informant claimed 
that he discussed the drug deal with a suspect in the kitchen of 
the reputed "drug house," then changed his story to say the 
discussion occurred in the front room. Id. at 425. At trial, he 
implicated only the defendant, whereas minutes earlier he testified 
that several people were involved. Id. Finally, the informant 
simultaneously claimed that he was and then was not involved in the 
drug deal. Id. 
The accomplice testimony here exhibits similar 
inconsistencies which render the evidence too "insubstantial" to 
support the aggravated arson conviction. Id. For example, the 
accomplices expressed confusion about the details of the bomb 
assembly. Dutson claimed he used bottles laying around the Fox 
apartment; Chacon claimed Samora gathered the bottles from outside; 
Samora denied gathering the bottles at all. R. 131 [132,169] , 
132 [223] ; A.B. 24. Moreover, Fox and Chacon gave contradictory 
3 
testimony about their involvement. On the one hand, Fox and Chacon 
claimed to not know that four King Mafia Disciples ("KMD") were 
assembling bombs, yet Fox admitted to procuring gasoline and Chacon 
admitted buying masks and gloves. R. 131 [119,136-37,196] ; A.B. 23-
24. Finally, the accomplice testimony was contradictory about 
Flores7 presence at the Fox apartment. Samora stated that he did 
not remember whether Flores was present; Dutson, Chacon and Fox had 
only vague memories about others present, but definitely remembered 
Flores. R. 131 [124,171,183] , 132 [122] ; A.B. 22. Hence, as in 
Earl, the evidence against Flores is contradictory and, therefore, 
"insubstantial." 27 F.3d at 425. Moreover, there is no other 
corroborative evidence linking Flores to the crime. Id. 
Accordingly, the aggravated arson conviction is not supported by 
sufficient evidence. Id. 
The instant case is also similar to Yoakam, where the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a conviction for insufficient 
evidence. 116 F.3d at 1350. In Yoakam, the defendant was 
convicted of arson, the circumstantial evidence against him being 
his involvement in a business deal and his presence in the building 
just prior to the fire. Id. at 1349. The Yoakam Court 
acknowledged that there was sufficient evidence of arson, but 
reversed the conviction because there was not enough evidence 
linking defendant to the crime. Id. The court reasoned that 
neither Yoakam's presence nor his association in the business deal 
was enough to convict him of arson. Id. at 1349-50. Consequently, 
the Court held that the jury's guilty verdict must have been the 
4 
improper "product of speculation and conjecture." Id. 
As in Yoakam, Flores' mere association with and presence 
among other KMD members gathered at the Fox apartment does not 
establish his guilt where the evidence against him is otherwise 
insubstantial. 116 F.3d at 1350. "Mere presence . . . may create 
suspicion, but it does not establish participation or guilt." 
United States v. Leos-Ouiiada, 107 F.3d 786, 796 (10th Cir. 1997); 
see also A.B. 19-20 (discussing how Flores' presence with KMD may 
mislead jury into basing guilty verdict on association alone). 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that Flores was at the Fox 
apartment to attend a party, rather than as an accomplice to the 
conspiracy. See A.B. 20-22. Hence, the conflicting accomplice 
testimony indicates such a level of insubstantiality that the 
jury's verdict must have been the improper result of "speculation 
or conjecture." Yoakam, 116 F.3d at 1350; see also Pratt, 475 P.2d 
at 1014 (witness testimony was so "self-contradictory, vague and 
uncertain" that it was insufficient to connect defendant with 
wrongdoing)3; see, e.g. , Walker, 743 P. 2d at 195 (insufficient 
evidence that defendant was triable as adult where testimony 
thereto consisted of contradictory and uncorroborated testimony of 
mother of child sex abuse victim). 
3
 The State asserts that Pratt is not authoritative in this 
case because it was decided under Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953 
as amend.), the predecessor to section 77-17-7 requiring other 
evidence to corroborate accomplice testimony. See S.B. 24 n.7. 
Pratt is instructive, however, to the extent that it illustrates 
how the evidence in support of a conviction must be sufficiently 
consistent and clear, regardless of whether it consists of 
accomplice testimony alone or other independent evidence. 475 
P.2d at 1014. 
5 
The State also challenges Flores' brief on the ground that 
Utah has "abandoned to a considerable extent its historical 
skepticism regarding uncorroborated witness testimony when it 
enacted Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-1 (1982), providing for conviction 
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." S.B. 25. Even 
though the law now allows for a conviction on this basis, this fact 
does not dispense with the need to ensure that such evidence, 
especially uncorroborated accomplice testimony, is substantial and 
credible. See Earl, 27 F.3d at 425 (federal conviction may be had 
upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony if credible and 
substantial) (citing United States v. Lai, 944 F.2d 1434, 1440 (9th 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 947 (1992)). Accordingly, this 
Court must still review the uncorroborated accomplice testimony 
with caution notwithstanding the enactment of section 77-17-7. 
The State further asserts that the leniency-for-testimony 
factor does not present a concern because the witnesses 
"emphatically and convincingly testified that their agreements 
required their truthful testimony, that they risked prison if they 
did lie under oath, and that they were, in fact, telling the 
truth." S.B. 27. The State adds that the jury was instructed to 
regard with caution the accomplice testimony received in exchange 
for leniency. S.B. 28; see also R. 65, 66 (jury instructions nos. 
8 and 9). 
The State overvalues the accomplices' emphatic declarations 
that they are speaking truth, especially where such testimony is 
routinely regarded with caution. Oaths indicate a measure of truth 
6 
to the extent that their purpose : - ""|l HI,,, I I i I |,L. attiant 
consci?"-"1 >- ^or -,-, .. legal obligation to tell the 
. \ . . sons v. Barnes, 8 71 P. 2d 5 If. s?n (lit ah l^'i i 
±d 513 U.S. 5f 1994) (quotation I I « «l I I M ^ ^ I , oaths are 
not d o ^ , -^ -^  witnesses may be prone to at 
least embellish th- truth to suit their purpose? e, c.a., 
State v. Nielsen, ^27 P.2d n'~ _L Knowingly 
misrepresented :i i\ .amor* _x ^ffiaavx-L secure search warrant 
and again under oat n at defendant's prel im" ^ =^v hc^rina' .* see a ^ ^ 
State v. Vir- Qib P. 2d ^" truth 
rar^ never simple quoting Oscar Wilde, The 
Importance of i Ernest, Act li , TV,~' ^ * "^1ihc~" ' awVi- . ..- . 
testimony ^° narticu" v .r:e accomplices are 
rect.vxiiJ -i.iency ^c^ United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d ". 9Q «'*-: 
Cir (accomplice testimony "raises ---; • 
problems since the" ; ^T<~ . _o tabricate or mold 
Llicii testimony escape prosecution [or] lighten their 
sentences") (citations om^ 1' 0 T o r r 1 ,:- ..at 
the accomplices t^-t-* ._ ,... statements does not 
cillnvidte the concerns arising from i;:;^  leniency-for-testimony 
exchanges. 
_ ,._ .* - -.^eviate the concerns 
pleat _-^ . -^ ^ o ple« bargains„ While the instructions alerted the 
jury to the credibility concerns inherent ny, 
the 4,,rv was t=p.j. he assumption that "birds of a 
feather are flocked together" and, therefore, Flores must have been 
7 
guilty despite the insubstantiality of the accomplices' testimony. 
See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454, 69 S.Ct. 716, 
93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (finding "naive" the 
assumption that prejudicial effects of accomplice testimony can be 
overcome by cautionary instruction) (citing Blumenthal v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 539, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947); Skidmore 
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948)). Hence, 
the jury, unable to divorce themselves from their assumptions, may 
have been inclined to convict Flores despite the instruction. 
Finally, the State claims the inconsistency in the testimony 
is "immaterial" alongside the "mass of consistent material 
evidence" and the corroborating testimony of the investigators. 
S.B. 28-33. The State downplays several discrepant areas and 
suggests that although the accomplices gave varying accounts, it is 
enough that they all agreed that Flores was present and that he was 
responsible. Id. As discussed supra and in his opening brief, 
significant questions exist regarding material facts given the 
inconsistent statements of Fox, Chacon, Dutson, and Samora. See 
A.B. 21-25. The varying testimonies represent a troublesome degree 
of fabrication, ultimately bringing into question the accomplices7 
claims of Flores' involvement. Id. at 25. When viewed in 
combination with their motives to tailor their testimony based on 
the plea bargain arrangements, the inconsistent accomplice 
testimony is too insubstantial to support Flores' conviction. Id. ; 
see also Ouada, 918 P.2d at 887 (jurors must have had reasonable 
doubt where evidence is exceedingly inconclusive). Hence, contrary 
8 
to the state's assertion ""he evidf^ r—- - *• _^  :-; so 
consi^4-- . siscencies become "immaterial " 
Moreover, such inconsistencies cannot be dismissed sirr". 
because each accomplice manaaec ::e crime. 
Arc- •*• - .. .evitaJDiy implicates the defendant :in trial 
and, therefore, raises credibility concerns - Krulewit^ 
U.S. at 4^4 (disc^ssino ~- •-• provides "some 
;-:, ...gc„.»g" ana n^w jurors then easily assume defendant 
yunty by association) ,s noted by the Utah Supreme "' 
acknowledged by the State, 
11
 - iice may be motivated to falsify because 
OL a to blame someone else in connection with 
the crime; or in the hope of obtaining leniency; or 
the very fact that he is involved in the crime may 
tend to impair his credibility. These combine tc 
justify looking upon his testimony with rant-inn •* 
State \ ^ , .. . . .quotation omitted) ; 
,-+ "~ Given i nc weaknesses inherent in accomplice testimony, 
the fact that each accomplice 1 rr^1 i ?atcJ * ; bpense 
with •• • * 'Zdttzri . v-. _ . ^ i.L^ot^ncy *.. .ne.r testimony 
in cr .- , . ,.^  sustain Flores' conviction.4 
The "corroborating" testimonie> " :'"£.-LiJaL , .err 
Payn^ a: ~ rf-•<=.-
 lw _w.w . otidjjiiitate the weaknesses 
inherent in the accomplice testimony. Primarily, the investigators 
4
 Although section 77-17-1 allows for conviction based on 
the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, such testimony must 
Still be consistent and substantial to support the conviction. 
kence, language from Ross remains instructive although it was 
decided prior to the enactment of section 77-17-1 to the extent 
that it explains the credibility concerns inherent in accomplice 
testimony. 
had no knowledge of the culprits of the arson. R. 132[253-292] . 
The State Crime Lab did not discover any identifiable fingerprints 
on any of the bottles. R. 132 [288] . The investigators7 testimony 
only established that the fire was caused by arson and that four 
incendiary devices (molotov cocktails) were used based on the 
presence of broken beer bottles, soaked rags and the smell of 
gasoline permeating the air. R. 132[257-63,272-92]. None of this 
information implicates Flores in the crime, however, and therefore 
does not corroborate the accomplice testimony to such an extent 
that the inconsistencies in the accomplice testimony become 
"immaterial." 
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING REMARK IS IMPROPER AND 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE HARMFUL ERROR. 
The State urges that the prosecutor's closing reference to 
victims "burning to death" is not improper and, at any rate, does 
not constitute harmful, reversible error. See S.B. 33-43. 
A. The Prosecutor's Remark Is Improper. 
In defense of the prosecutor's remark, the State disregards 
the fact that the judge sustained Flores' objection, indicating 
that the trial court itself found the statement to be improper. 
R. 132 [326] . Instead, the State asserts that the comment was a 
"reasonable rebuttal" to defense counsel's comment on the 
importance of the case to Flores, and a reasonable inference 
"supported by the evidence." S.B. 37, 40. 
The State's argument strays far from the test for 
determining the propriety of a remark: a remark is proper so long 
as it does not call to the jury's attention matters not properly 
10 
considered in determininq the ve.r:1.' Sec ouctLe v. vaidez, 513 
P.2~- *~~ .o aiscussed full> ' his opening 
or let, the prosecutor's vivid closing reference *-^  victimr 
to death" amounted <-n inadmissih"1 -, ./aence i j u t m e l y 
exr'Md^ ..wc.u^  -=^-j, 'ji.d- r - .s of Evidence (1998^, 
given its propensity to inflame th^ -i-i^ r
 c-
improperly suggest "hat -^ jiven the near-
T--JI c;.::;s. See A.B. 27-32; see also State v. Smith, 
7uu P,2a 1106, 11 "Ttah 1985) ('remarks ^ - m e s " 
some obligation be" : ^ ne gu-^t -i innocence 
;.-i:u^ .^ ," improper). "Given -he clarity of the law" 
regarding the inadmissibility of victim '-'^e^ * , i I. is 
obvious "that th •oseeul • '" " "emarks called i.o the jurors' 
\ • - '.-.-n matters Lucy were not justified in considering," State 
v. Emmet- 8 39 P 7Pi, '?«* /r^^u ^nni , , ,,
 it j jt , , , r emark 
"obvious"! - JI mat ion w^ .^..^  DB excluded under Utah 
-*u4 and r \ L ^ 9? e also A.B 25-32. Hence, the 
prosecutor's reference .-*--•- -nproper. 
See Vaidez 
The State's argument likewise ignores the Drincio'l : 
counsel, particularly prosecutors --..-v :.es ^. uhe 
• State cites to State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1982;, x^x asserting that a similar prosecutorial reference to the 
possible injury to the victim was deemed appropriate and, 
therefore, the instant remark is also proper. Williams is 
distinguishable from the instant case, however, with regard to 
tihe nature of the comment and the quality of the evidence against 
the defendant. See A.B. 33-35. Accordingly, the State's 
reliance on Williams i s misplaced. 
11 
government, are duty-bound to honor the boundaries of closing 
argument and present their summations with a mind to seek justice 
and not simply to secure a conviction.6 See Emmett, 83 9 P. 2d at 
787 (discussing prosecutor's heightened duty to refrain from over-
zealous argument) ; see also Andreason, 718 P. 2d at 402 (counsel has 
broad latitude in closing but boundaries must be observed). 
Bearing in mind the boundaries of closing argument, as well 
as the general exclusion of victim impact evidence, the remark 
cannot be justified as a reasonable rebuttal to defense counsel's 
reference to the importance of the case to Flores. Defense 
counsel, at the close of his summation, reminded the jury of its 
important duty to impartially decide the case when he stated, "for 
Miguel Flores, this is [the] most important [trial] . " R. 132 [319] . 
He did not mention the victims and did not dwell on the point 
beyond the one sentence. Id. The prosecutor, however, went beyond 
the boundaries of permissible rebuttal when he named each resident 
individually and stated that they "came close to burning to death." 
R. 132 [325] . Nothing in defense counsel's single sentence opened 
the door to such vivid victim impact evidence, especially in 
reference to an event that did not happen and where defense counsel 
did not argue at length about the importance of the case to Flores. 
C.f. State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997) 
6
 The State mischaracterizes Flores' reliance upon this 
principle as an endorsement of per se reversible error. See S.B. 
42-43. Nothing in Flores' opening brief would suggest this and, 
in fact, Flores refers to the principle merely as a 
"consideration" for the court in deciding the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct. See A.B. 26. 
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(prosecutorial remark about defendant ^^ ^as 
proper w1--- ~* '•-* . , diguing "at length" for 
acquittal based on State's failure to call same witness). 
Moreover, the prosecutor's remark - - 11 I n iei"L 1^ Lied 
t" -h- - ^ •'-• ,L'nv •"" I' ' I1" lie investigator Long opined that 
11
 , -.; . incendiary devices would have ianited," the house 
would havp collapsed. r " r"" ' ' : nerrera 
("T---r-v-. _j ijiLi;ei opined that the chances of survival 
were "very little 132 [292] . Long dio *~ speculate rf-cr,- '" 
the "survivability f ~'~ h^r rps: _ven tJiat Long's 
s11 a I euieul , i luien^ , .-..^^ ,. Herrera, : :>- evidence did not support 
the prosecutor's reference to "Mary Archuletta ' -^ ^  
Herrera [si-" .^ ^  _ i.cuse tnat came close 
j -~ — ~ L-2[325] onsequently, the remark ^~ 
not justified. 
P• The Remark Amounts ^ ncv ersible Error. 
-.. :•" prosecutor's remark amounts to harmful, reversible 
error The State urges the error was harmless qi vf-n Lliu \ ytiiyhl <»! 
evidence aaa . _o prosecutor did not dwell on the 
/ictim impact information, and the trial court's finding that the 
jurors did not seem to be phased K^ +_he ccrr--'^. ^ 
T-W> state also ^-- -* ^red lay the judge's 
• -. ^ admonition ..u the "ur\ disregard the prosecutor's 
statements and th* wo general instruct! o n s reqa rd 111< i ) \ i . ipei i 1 y 
consider---" ..... ^ J. 
As an initial matter, the evidence against Flores is not 
"overwhelming" as the State suggests. Id. at 42. As noted in 
Point I supra and in his opening brief, A.B. 12-25, the evidence 
against Flores consists solely of the inconsistent and 
uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, all but one exchanging 
testimony for beneficial plea agreements and/or immunity. Where 
the evidence is so inconclusive, the likelihood that the jury is 
improperly influenced by a prosecutor's remark is great. See State 
v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986). The Andreason Court 
explained, 
[w]hen the evidence in the record is 
sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely 
influenced by an improper argument. In such 
instances, they are more susceptible to the 
suggestion that factors other than the evidence 
before them should determine a defendant's guilt or 
innocence. . . . In view of [] highly marginal . . . 
evidence . . . , a reasonable likelihood exists that 
in the absence of the prosecutor's prejudicial 
argument, there might have been a different result. 
Id. By the same token, the jurors in the instant case were likely 
influenced toward conviction by the prosecutor's appeal to the 
victims ordeal given that the evidence was otherwise conflicting 
and insubstantial. 
The State further claims that the prosecutor's remark was 
harmless since he "only briefly commented on the victims' 
circumstances, and in accord with the trial court's ruling, moved 
on and concluded his argument." S.B. 40. Actually, the prosecutor 
did not cease his commentary. After the judge spoke, the 
prosecutor reiterated, "I simply make the point that this is an 
important case. We expect and we are certain that you will 
conscientiously perform your duty." R. 132 [326] . In so doing, the 
14 
reference to the victims v/ap echoed -spire nhe 
court' o^, see also A.b. 36. Hence, the 
prosecutor did u t immediately quit u : s argument and thereby 
mitigate the harm resultina therefr^r, 
yeixai -.instruction7 and the twc written 
instructions", Ficres notes ir. his openina bri^f that cautionary 
instructions are r-^  alwavs ef^^ . ejuaice once an 
' •^-
 b
^° v^-. c^i _ j.roib .„^',- See /- * . 5^ 35 (citing 
State v. Peters, 7^ 6 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah a-r- T QQ hav,- n 
delusion that a l^:+-ina -np* ,-„:.ous prejudice") 
.keiihood that the prejudice was not 
overcome by the instructions is heightened given thar- --n-: 
against Flores is weak cnererore, wcie mere 
susceptible to an improper reference to victim impact testimony. 
See supra Point 12-25. Given the suaaes-
where the evident * , MIL i,tn,«< iv. -_.. le-ct oi .he instruction 
^jequaie. 
Finally, the State asserts that tl--~ 
given the trial , , ubervanori L.^L the jurors did not 
Upon Flores' objection ,^ , uhe prosecutor's ieniaijv, ^ *ie 
juuy " "I am going to sustain the objection. The jury has 
been lud that statements of counsel are not evidence and 
they are not to consider them as evidence." T? 1 ^ r ^ c l 
8
 insurucu-w** xiumbex J> bidies in pertinent part, "You are 
to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in this trial 
and the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids you to be 
governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." R. 58. 
Instruction number 4 provides in part, "Statements and 
arguments of counse1 ire not evidence in the case." R. 60. 
seem to be phased by the comment. See S.B. 41-42. Even though the 
court did so find, this does not in-and-of-itself wholly mitigate 
the harm caused by the remark.9 There are many reasons why a juror 
may not display his or her emotional response to a provocative 
statement, including fatigue (the prosecutor made the remark at the 
end of a two-day trial filled with lengthy witness testimony), 
respect for the decorum of the court and the impartial role of the 
jury, or out of a sense of gravity of the idea of the deaths of the 
victims. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the remark 
did not register a response among the jurors. Given the many 
concerns otherwise arising from the comment (see supra; A.B. 25-
38) , the fact that the jurors did not appear to overtly react 
should not dispense with the harmfulness analysis here. 
III. FLORES' PLEA AGREEMENT IS LEGALLY INVALID 
SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONDUCT AN 
ADEQUATE COLLOQUY UNDER RULE 11. 
A. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over This Matter 
Since The Trial Court's Noncompliance With 
Rule 11 Constitutes Plain Error. 
The State asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction over 
9
 The State relies on State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 
(Utah 198 9), in which the Supreme Court held that a witness' 
inadvertent comment about the defendant's parole officer was not 
prejudicial where the trial court noted, in part, that the 
"statement was lost on the jury" and "it observed no visible 
reaction of the jurors to the testimony." Id. at 1373. The 
State's reliance on Williams is misplaced since the prejudicial 
comment at issue there made no direct reference to the defendant 
or any of his previous crimes, and it was not clear that the 
parole officer referred to was that of the defendant. Id. The 
instant remark, by contrast, is not as innocuous; the prosecutor 
here tolled the name of each resident, then conjured an horrific 
image in the jurors minds of the victims "burning to death." 
Unlike the comment in Williams, the prosecutor's remark could not 
have been easily lost on the jurors. Id. 
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this matter since Flores did not mow* •<» "' > i « 11 , i t his guilty plea 
in r ' -___ . _ .. Tliis Court, however, held 
tn^ Kwj.c i; cuailenge to p.he voluntariness of - r"^ --
heard for the fir?t time on HDDP -jurz lai^s 10 
ensi iienaant entered the plea knowingly and 
voluntarily pursuant to Rule 11 and State v. Gibbo: r, "-V" r ~ 1 
(Utah 19871 J^*-' "^ incr tri"1 :: ^n ensuring 
vi'liiiifai i Jin-1', ^ xva±c ._ , jiar; R. Cri:... 1~\ -;l.r98j 
(outlining procedure for accepting pleas) ; see also State_v\. 
«: r i s, *7QP r '"'~ ~~' ~v^ Court reasoned 
uoii^Liy * ump^ y- A - *-U.T and Gibbons 
constitutes plain ^rror and, therefore, -p<~— ^ *-s -
t~- hoar ^^e issue ip^  _^ . jg. icitmg Boykin 
v , aidpama, _ _ ^ , ie, -*„, ^ 9 S, Ct. 170'*, 23 L.Ed.2d ?"74 (1969) 
(finding "error, plain on its fac° r^ thp r--.~ * 
judqe H a::-!" '" - " _ zy p^u wiihuuL an affirmative 
•/• -..; '-. ^  - was intelligent and voluntary", , . in such cases, 
10
 See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah lyuv) 
(reviewing court will not review guilty plea for first time on 
appeal; defendant must first move to withdraw plea in trial 
court, then, if unsuccessful, appeal from trial court's denial); 
see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995) (defendant must move to 
withdraw guilty plea within thirty days afi-pr omt-^ -
3:1
 _ne state aadiL±undiiy m ~^ -- . •>„- Flores has "failed 
to allege that the trial court cu. . ced p.am error." S.B. 44. 
A review of Utah cases concerning review of plea agreements under 
a Rule 11 / plain error analysis reveals that defendants have 
not; historically, presented their argument under the heading of 
"plain error." Rather, it has been sufficient that a defendant 
Establishes from the record that the trial did not comply 
with Rule 11. In so doing, the defendant n. z the appropriate 
"plain error" showing. See, e.g., Pharris, 798 P.2d at 774-78 
(finrHna n ^ ^ error based on defendant's discussion of colloquy 
the appropriate procedure is to remand the case to the trial court 
in order to allow the defendant to move for withdrawal of the plea. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-12. 
Where the trial court in the instant case failed to comply 
with Rule 11 in ensuring the knowing and voluntary nature of 
Flores' plea (see infra Point III.B.; A.B. 38-44), Flores' claim 
amounts to plain error and is, therefore, properly before this 
Court. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311. 
B. The Guilty Plea Is Legally Invalid Since The 
Trial Court Did Not Comply With Rule 11. 
The State asserts that the colloquy conducted by the judge, 
combined with the plea affidavit informing Flores of the 
possibility of consecutive sentencing, satisfies the "strict 
compliance" standard for Rule 11 set forth in Gibbons. See S.B. 
45-49; see also Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. The State cites State 
v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991), a per curiam decision 
indicating that a trial court may establish the voluntariness of a 
plea through use of the plea affidavit along with the colloquy. 
Id.; Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217-18 n.2 (criticizing State v. Dastrup, 
818 P.2d 594 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992), which held that trial court may not rely on affidavit). 
Even assuming that Maguire controls, the plea affidavit 
alongside the colloquy in the instant case does not establish that 
shortcomings); Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (finding plain error 
although defendant did not explicitly outline "plain error" 
analysis). Hence, Flores' claim should not be dismissed, as the 
state asserts, for lack of a "plain error" analysis. Flores' 
discussion of the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11 
adequately briefs the argument. 
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Flores entered the plea knowingly I mud , '.pec^ricaily, 
Flores i iJ^qucttt-^ informed about the possibility of 
consecutive sentencing as required by Rule life ' ^  . Whil^ 
plea affidavit cor?-a ins lanquaae rea^-- ..^ - - sentences1^, 
the tr: _iearly communicate this 
possibility Flores. See discussion herein; A p, " : * ~ 
With regarr ^lvl explained 
tha* infl » l ..^JI conduce an inquiry t. . establish that 
the defendant understands the affidavit and volunt^r- H, 
iefendant has t^ad, mUei si u ..J, and acknowledges ail 
i\ , .:. jntained therein] :^ • omissions 
ambiguities -ffidavit must be r*]-~i fi& " 
hearing, as must ar « >-f ^ /.-iif.1... . ^  ..cirse of the plea 
. " v. at 217 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P. 2d 4 7 0, 
; Jtah App. 199 cert. denied (1992• . ' *- .-----, . 
The record I , il"i i \„ _,. _ ^ . established that 
(ieieiibe counsel read the affidavit to Flores and that Flores 
understood its terms, and immediately ucon l ' - < i i ec " ion to 
Flores *~~ ~: « ^..attu, "I don't wan: to do 
also A.jb. 41 4 3 discussing circumstances 
indicating Flores' Jack of knowledcre ^or^e^ -• --r versus 
concurrent sent>
 y^o^-. .-Hough court recessed for a 
moment w:^ .^ .c-. Flores and his attorney spoke privately •-•^  ~~urt 
itself did not take any measures ^ .ovious 
12
 The affidavit reads in pertinent part that "the sen/ten^ 
may be consecutd ve " n 
misgivings about the affidavit. Rather, the court merely inquired 
whether Flores spoke with his attorney, and then stated for the 
record that "Flores has had an opportunity to discuss some matters 
with [his attorney] . . . [and] has executed the statement of the 
defendant." R. 101 [8-9] . 
Where the affidavit contains the critical language regarding 
the possibility of consecutive sentencing, it was incumbent upon 
the court, at the moment of Flores' verbalized doubt, to conduct a 
more probing colloquy to clarify "%any uncertainties raised in the 
course of the plea colloquy.'" Maguire, 830 P.2d at 217 (quoting 
Smith, 812 P.2d at 477). The court's shallow inquiry, however, 
fell short of establishing Flores' knowing and voluntary acceptance 
of the terms of the plea where the court did no more than ascertain 
that Flores talked to his attorney. See Gibbons, 740 P. 2d at 1313 
("[t]rial courts may not rely on defense counsel . . . to satisfy 
the specific concerns of Rule 11(e)"). Accordingly, the trial 
court did not satisfy the Gibbons "strict compliance" test and the 
plea is, therefore, invalid. 
The fact that the trial court later stated that it was not 
bound by the prosecutor's sentencing "recommendations" does not 
fulfill its duty.13 As noted in Flores' opening brief, the court 
13
 The trial court stated: "Do you understand that I've 
heard some of the recommendations from the prosecutor today 
relative to sentencing? Do you understand that those 
recommendations are not binding on me; in other words, I will 
listen to them carefully, I will consider them, but I'm not 
required to follow them?" 
Flores responded in the affirmative. R. 101 [14]. 
20 
never articulated the words "consecutive" or "concurrent," nor did 
it explain the "possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences" in lay terms that Flores would understand. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e)(5); see also A.B. 41-43. Moreover, the court's 
reference was not a direct response to either the prosecutor's 
recommendation for "concurrent" sentencing or Flores7 verbalized 
misgivings regarding the affidavit. Rather, the court made its 
statement towards the end of the plea hearing. Hence, Flores 
likely did not make the mental connection and remained confused 
about the terms of the plea concerning consecutive sentencing. 
Accordingly, the court did not fulfill its duty under Rule 11 and 
Gibbons to ensure that Flores entered the plea knowingly and 
voluntarily.14 Accordingly, this Court should vacate the murder 
14
 The State asserts that Flores7 confusion in this case 
was not compounded by the fact that Flores anticipated concurrent 
sentencing. See S.B. 43 n.14. The State also claims that 
Flores7 hope for concurrent sentencing is "unfounded" given that 
Flores acknowledged that the prosecutor fulfilled his promise to 
suggest concurrent sentencing and that the plea affidavit 
informed Flores of the possibility of consecutive sentencing. 
Id. 
Flores7 hopes for more lenient treatment are not rendered 
"unfounded" simply because he acknowledged the prosecutor's 
fulfillment of his promise, nor because the affidavit asserted 
the possibility of consecutive sentencing. Even though Flores 
was never promised concurrent sentencing, both the affidavit and 
the prosecutor planted the seed of hope in his mind that such may 
be possible notwithstanding any disclaimers that the court was 
not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. This hope, even 
though non-binding on the court, can be one of the most 
compelling considerations when a defendant decides to enter a 
plea. Coupled with an inadequate colloquy, such hope may blind 
the defendant to the reality that it may not be realized. Hence, 
Flores7 hope for concurrent sentencing is not "unfounded" and, in 
fact, is a natural human response. This said, the trial court 
should have proceeded with even greater caution during the plea 
colloquy to establish that Flores did not have overblown hopes of 
concurrent sentencing instead of relying on the affidavit alone, 
21 
conviction and remand to the trial court to allow Flores to 
withdraw the plea. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311. 
CONCLUSION 
Flores requests this Court to reverse his aggravated arson 
conviction for insufficient evidence. Should the Court find the 
evidence sufficient, Flores requests this case to be remanded for 
a new trial given the improper, harmful prosecutorial closing 
remarks. Flores additionally requests this Court to vacate his 
murder conviction and remand to the trial court to allow him to 
withdraw his plea. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument. 
SUBMITTED this \\ day of May, 1998. 
)ui/JL L • &>j?*pf* 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC 6 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
especially considering Flores' verbalized misgivings about the 
affidavit. 
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